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Is it possible to create a theory of how social procedures work with a view
to understanding them and designing better ones? I want to start with an
illustrative example of a common difficulty.

The two horsemen: Suppose we want to find out which of two horses is
faster. This is easy, we race them against each other. The horse which reaches
the goal first is the faster horse. And surely this method should also tell us
which horse is slower, it is the other one. However, there is a complication
which will be instructive.
Two horsemen are on a forest path chatting about something. A passerby
M , the mischief maker, comes along and having plenty of time and a desire
for amusement, suggests that they race against each other to a tree a short
distance away and he will give a prize of $100. However, there is an interesting
twist. He will give the $100 to the owner of the slower horse. Let us call the
two horsemen Bill and Joe. Joe’s horse can go at 35 miles per hour, whereas
Bill’s horse can only go 30 miles per hour. Since Bill has the slower horse, he
should get the $100.
The two horsemen start, but soon realize that there is a problem. Each one is
trying to go slower than the other and it is obvious that the race is not going
to finish. There is a broad smile on the canny passerby’s face as he sees that he
is having some amusement at no cost. Figure I, below, explains the difficulty.
Here Bill is the row player and Joe is the column player. Each horseman can
make his horse go at any speed upto its maximum. But he has no reason to
use the maximum. And in figure I, the left columns are dominant (yield a
better payoff) for Joe and the top rows are dominant for Bill. Thus they end
up in the top left hand corner, with both horses going at 0 miles per hour.
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Figure I
However, along comes another passerby, let us call her S, the problem solver,
and the situation is explained to her. She turns out to have a clever solution.
She advises the two men to switch horses. Now each man has an incentive to
go fast, because by making his competitor’s horse go faster, he is helping his
own horse to win! Figure II shows how the dominant strategies have changed.
Now Joe (playing row) is better off to the bottom, and Bill playing column is
better off to the right – they are both urging the horse they are riding (their
opponents’ horse) as fast as the horse can go. Thus they end up in the bottom
right corner of figure II. Joe’s horse, ridden by Bill comes first and Bill gets
the $100 as he should.
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Figure II
Of course, if the first passerby had really only wanted to reward the slower
horse (or its owner) he could have done this without the horses being switched
and for a little extra money. He could have kept quiet about the $100 and
offered a prize of $10 to the owner of the faster horse. Then when the race
was over, he would hand over the $10 to Joe and $100 to Bill. Here the effect
would be achieved by hiding from the two horsemen what their best strategy
was, and fooling them into thinking that some other action was in fact better.
While the problem of finding the faster horse, and that of finding the slower,
are equivalent algorithmically, they are not equivalent game theoretically when
the men ride their own horses. The equivalence is restored when the two men
switch horses.

The Recommendation Letter: For a practical analogue of the two
horses example, consider the issue of grades and letters of recommendation.
Suppose that Prof. Meyer is writing a letter of recommendation for his student
Maria and Prof. Shankar is writing one for his student Peter. Both believe
that their respective students are good, but only good. Not very good, not
excellent, just good. Both also know that only one student can get the job or
scholarship. Under this circumstance, it is clear that both of the advisers are
best off writing letters saying that their respective student is excellent. This
is strategic behaviour in a domain familiar to all of us. Sometimes employers
will try to counter this by appealing to third parties for an evaluation, but

the close knowledge that the two advisers have of their advisees cannot be
discovered very easily. And unfortunately, there is no obvious analogue to the
strategem of exchanging horses.
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In Figure III above, J represents job and NJ represents no job for the student.
Then Meyer’s lower strategies dominate his upper ones. And for Shankar, his
rightward strategies dominate the strategies to the left. Hence, with each
playing his dominant strategies, they end up in the lower right hand corner
with neither student getting the job.

Admission Decisions: A similar difficulty arises with the selection of
students for admission to college. Suppose that prestigious university P U
wants to choose between two students A, B who have gone to different schools.
Not wanting to rely entirely or primarily on scores obtained on some multiple
choice test, they put a heavier emphasis on grades. But now consider the
teachers Ta , Tb of the students A, B. Ta naturally wants her student A to get
in and she can help by giving him a higher score than he deserves. Whatever
pangs of conscience she might feel at this will be assuaged by the thought that
probably teacher Tb is already giving a higher score to B than he deserves,
and it would not be fair to A to give him a more realistic score, it would only
penalize him. Teacher Tb will have similar thoughts and thus both students
will get higher scores than they deserve.
Is there a solution? Surely university P U could create a database of scores
obtained by students at various schools and the eventual performance of these

students. Schools which habitually give out high score could be downrated,
thereby restoring some measure of objectivity.

The Election: For yet another situation which is related consider the
case of an election with three candidates A, B, C and three voters a, b, c. The
election will consist of two phases. In the first phase, A will be matched against
B. After that, the winner of the first election will run against C.
The three voters a, b, c have preferences, respectively: A > B > C for a,
B > C > A for b and C > A > B for c. Since two out of three voters prefer
A to B, A will win over B. After that, A will run against C and since both b
and c prefer C to A, C will be elected. This is not an outcome that a is likely
to be happy with. However, suppose that a pretends that his preferences are
actually B > A > C and votes for B against A in the first round. In that case
B will win the first election and go on to win against C as well.
Thus by pretending that his preferences are different from what they are, voter
a ensures a better outcome for himself.
The Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem says that such situations, where voters
benefit by voting differently from their actual preferences, are endemic to all
electoral systems. Indeed, in the last presidential election in the US, people
whose first preference was Nader would have done better to vote for Gore
instead. As it is, by voting for Nader, they ensured the election of Bush who
was (for most Nader voters) a lower preference than Gore.
———
As we saw, there are many reasons why social procedures do not always succeed
or when they do, are cumbersome and give rise to unintended ill effects. This
fact may seem to be part of the domain. People just aren’t as tidy and well
behaved as computers, they are willful and forgetful and selfish. Moreover,
different people have different ideas of what is the best thing to do in any given
situation so that conflicts can arise even between well meaning individuals.
I want to argue that even though all the difficulties mentioned are real and
no doubt we shall never have social procedures which work ideally, we can
nonetheless have a theory of social procedures which is analogous to the formal theories for computer algorithms which exist in computer science. I am
referring here to a whole group of theories, some of which have come into
existence during the early seventies and some are newer.
These are
a) the theories of program correctness which seek to prove that computer pro-

grams achieve the purpose (called the specification) which they are intended
to achieve.
b) the analysis of programs which seeks to analyse the efficiency of programs
in terms of resources utilized and the amount of time taken and
c) Concurrency theory, and Distributed computing which analyze the behaviour
of several computing processes acting together and which must ensure that different processes sharing some resources do not frustrate each others’ purposes
and do share information so that when a process needs to act, it knows the
facts that it needs to decide which action to take. We start with a discussion
of one way functions which are common in Computer Science but are less used
in real life.

One way functions: Suppose I give you the name of someone who is
listed in the telephone book and ask for her phone number. Then you can
find it easily by just looking up the name. Suppose, however that I give you
someone’s number and ask you for the name. You can also find that, but
essentially only by looking through the entire directory. There is no easy
procedure. So we have a function f from names to numbers which is easy to
‘compute’ and whose inverse g from numbers to names, while also computable,
is cumbersome and time consuming. The telephone directory is a one-way
function. A commonly used one way function in cryptography multiplies two
large primes p, q into a composite number n = p × q. Give p, q it is easy to
compute n. However, even though p, q are uniquely defined by n, they are, as
far as we know, extremely difficult to compute.
Now for our actual example:
At the American Philosophical Association (APA) meeting in New York (Dec
2000), we had an example of a one way function at work, in the wrong direction.
The program booklet gave, for each talk and session the name of the room
in which the talk or session was taking place. Thus for example many logic
sessions were in Gramercy. The program booklet also gave a floor map for
each of the four floors of the Hilton hotel where the conference was taking
place. Thus given the program and the map, one could find out in theory
where a given talk was. However, the maps constituted a one-way function
in the wrong direction. What they had was the sort of information, ‘what is
the name of the room at the north east corner of the third floor?’, and not
‘What is the location of the room with a given name?’ In other words, given
a location, the maps gave you the name of the room at that location. The
program itself, on the other hand, gave you the name of the room where a
particular talk was taking place. Thus we had two functions, the booklet gave
you a function f : events −→ room names. The maps gave you a function g :
locations −→ room names. Clearly one could not compose them without first

inverting the function g. Hence there was no easy way to find the location
from the name of the room. You could find the location using the maps, but
only by looking through all the floor maps.
It would have been easy to construct the program booklet in such a way that
one could use it to go directly to the room where a talk was being held, without
going through four maps. Instead of saying only that the Logic session was
in Gramercy suite, the booklet could have told you that it was in Gramercy,
on the south side of the second floor. A great deal of time could have been
saved for people running around, looking in vain for the room of their session
and many of whom missed the first few minutes of the talk. What the APA
booklet did was like giving you a phone book which allowed you to find names
from numbers, when what you needed was one which gave you numbers from
names.2
This example has some interest since there are no game theoretic issues here,
no one wants someone else to go to the wrong room for some talk (I hope). It
is merely an issue of algorithmic efficiency.

Resource sharing: The Sante Fe bar problem, first discussed by Brian
Arthur (1994) (see also Greenwald, Mishra and Parikh 1998) goes as follows.
There is a certain bar in Santa Fe where Irish music is offered on some nights.
There are (say) a hundred people who would like to go, but the bar has room
only for 60. People prefer to go if the bar is not crowded, but prefer not to go
if it is. Now suppose that people have (the same) data on previous weeks, how
many people went etc. And they want some theory which utilizes this data
to tell them whether the bar will be crowded this week. There cannot be a
correct theory because if there were, surely they ought to believe it, but then
if the theory said that the bar would be crowded, they would all not go and
the bar would not be crowded. If the theory said that the bar would not be
crowded, they would all go and the bar would be crowded. This is reminiscent
of the Russell set R which has the property that R ∈ R iff R 6∈ R.
Greenwald et al discuss several kinds of equilibria and learning bahaviours
which can arise when prospective bar-goers try to balance their desire to go,
with their information about the attendance in previous weeks, together with
the knowledge that the bar could very well be crowded on just the day they
choose to go. Ironically, the desire of the bar-goers to maximize their own
pleasure conflicts with the most efficient use of the bar itself. One device
suggested by Greenwald et al is a system of taxes imposed on the bar-goers,
2

Some maps do indeed give you a key whose effect is to diminish the wrong way function
problem. Thus a street map may be divided into squares and there may be a key which,
given the street name, gives you the square in which the street lies. But these keys still tend
to leave a lot of searching to be done.

the proceeds of which are shared among those who do not go. A simulation
shows that such a system works against (destructive) individual selfishnes and
maximizes total (social) satisfaction.

Vagueness and social algorithms: in the Philosophical Investigations, (paragraph 88) Wittgenstein asks:
If I tell someone “Stand roughly there” – may not this explanation
work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?
But isn’t it an inexact explanation? – Yes; why shouldn’t we call
it “inexact”? Only let us understand what “inexact” means. For
it does not mean “unusable”.
I would like to suggest that a degree of exactness is sufficient if it is adequate
for the particular social algorithm.
Vague predicates suffer from the Sorites kind of difficulties, first mentioned by
Eubulides. They do not have precise extensions, and cases where a predicate
clearly applies, can shade gradually into cases where it clearly does not. Social
algorithms have to provide for these difficulties too. As has been remarked by
Berlin and Kay, there is substantial difference between the way in which two
different individuals assign color terms to objects. A patch may be described
as purple by one viewer and as blue by another. This could lead to difficulties.
For instance, the color green, which indicates Go in traffic signals can gradually
shade into yellow, which means Slow, which can gradually shade into red, which
means Stop. If traffic signals were allowed to be of various colors, then different
observers might disagree on whether a particular signal was yellow or green.
This could lead to accidents. To avoid this problem we use signals of three
fixed colors only. The space of all colors which is connected and continuous,
allows for Sorites type paradoxes. But we replace it by the space of only three
colors, which is immune to such problems (Parikh 94, PPP 2001).
(Parikh 94) also gives an example of a situation where two people assign different extensions to the word ‘blue’ and yet when one of them describes a book as
blue to the other one, this actually helps in that the searching time is reduced.
In this example, Ann is helping Bob to find a particular book, say a topology
book, from among a thousand. Ann describes the topology book as blue, but
in fact Ann and Bob assign somewhat different extensions to the word ‘blue’.
It still turns out that Bob’s searching time is considerably reduced by Ann’s
information.

675
Bob

225

75

25
Ann

In the picture above, of the 1,000 books, there are 250 which Ann would
classify as blue and 300 which Bob would classify as blue, with an overlap
of 225 books which both would so classify, and 675 which neither would so
classify. Without Ann’s description, Bob must look through all books. With
her description “It’s blue”, Bob would look first through the books that he
thinks are blue and there is a 90% chance that Ann’s book is among them.
Thus his searching time is much reduced.
———
We now proceed to describe a particular formal theory for proving the correctness of (some) social algorithms.

Game logic and cake cutting: Game Logic is a sublogic of Dynamic
Logic, i.e. has fewer validities, but enjoys wider semantics. We saw that
Dynamic Logic is an extension of Hoare Logic and can be used to prove correctness of programs. Now a program can be thought of as a one person game
without opponents. Game logic extends this to proper (at first two person)
games.
The intuition is to think of a game as a predicate transform. Given a game G
and a set of winning positions X, we can define a set Y of starting positions
which are favourable to player I, i.e. Y is just the set of positions from which,
playing the game G, player I can ensure reaching the set X regardless of player

II’s actions. Then Y = G(X) as a function of X is monotonic in X. I.e. if
X ⊆ X 0 then G(X) ⊆ G(X 0 ). For obviously, if we make it easier for player
I to win, we increase the set of positions from which she can start and go on
to win. Game logic uses this mathematical fact to good purpose and studies
complicated games. We compose games from simpler games, and also compose
sets to form more complex sets. Moreover, each game, as we saw, forms a map
from sets to sets. Formal details follow. For a full treatment see (Parikh 1983,
1985).
Syntax: Finite number of atomic formulas, P, P1 , Q...etc
Finite number of atomic games: g1 , ..., gn
Formulas: Each Pi is a formula
If A, B are formulas, so are ¬A, A ∨ B
If A is a formula and α is a game, then (α)A is a formula.
Roughly, (α)A means that player I has a winning strategy to play the game α
in such a way that A will be true when the game finishes.
Games:
Each gi is a game.
If α, β are games, then so are α; β, α ∪ β, < α∗ >, and αd
If A is a formula, then < A? > is a game.
Here the complex games are seen as composed of simpler ones in an intuitive
way. E.g. the game α; β is just the composite game which consists of playing
first α and then β. < α∗ > is α played finitely many times, with player I
deciding when to stop. In the composite game α ∪ β, player I decides which
of the two games α, β to play. Finally, αd is just α with the two players
interchanged.

Semantics of Game Logic: Given, a set W of states and for each Pi a
subset π(Pi ) of W . For each gi a set ρ(gi ) ⊆ W ×P(W ). ρ is monotonic so that
if (s, X) ∈ ρ(g) and X ⊆ Y then (s, Y ) ∈ ρ(g). Let ρ(g)(X) = {s|(s, X) ∈
ρ(g)}. Then ρ(g) is a function from P(W ) to itself.
Now let
π(A ∨ B) = π(A) ∪ π(B)
π(¬A) = W − π(A)
π((α)A) = ρ(α)(π(A))
We let ρ(α; β)(X) = (ρ(α)((ρ(β)(X))
ρ(α ∪ β)(X) = ρ(α)(X) ∪ ρ(β)(X)
ρ(< α∗ >)(X) = µY (X ⊆ Y ∧ ρ(α)(Y ) ⊆ Y )

(where the minimization is relative to set inclusion)
ρ(< αd >)(X) = W − ρ(α)(W − X)
ρ(< A? >)(X) = π(A) ∩ X
A valid formula is one which is true at all points in all models, i.e. a formula
A such that π(A) is always W .
Complete axiomatization for the valid formulas of the dual free part
of Game Logic:
1. All tautologies (or a complete subset of them)
2. (α; β)A ↔ (α)(β)A
3. (α ∨ β)A ↔ (α)A ∨ (β)A
4. (< α∗ > A) ↔ (A ∨ (α)(< α∗ > A))
5. (< A? >)B ↔ A ∧ B
Rules:
1. Modus ponens: from A, A → B derive B.
2. Monotonicity: from A → B derive (α)A → (α)B
3. Bar induction: from (α)A → A derive (< α∗ >)A → A
This set of axioms and rules is complete. A sound and possibly complete
axiom for the dual operator is
(αd )A ↔ ¬(α)(¬A)

Cake cutting: In cake cutting the number of players goes up to n. The
cake cutting algorithm due to Banach and Knaster goes as follows. If there
are n players, then the first player cuts out a slice which she claims is her fair
share. Then the other players examine it in turn. Anyone who thinks it is too
big may reduce it and put something back in the main cake. After each one
has examined the slice, the last person to have reduced it, takes it. If no one
reduced it, then the person who cut the slice takes it. At this stage we have
n − 1 players left and the procedure is repeated. The following questions arise:
What does it mean to say that the cake cutting algorithm is fair?
How do we prove that it is fair?
The answer is that each player has a winning strategy to ensure µi (Pi ) ≥ 1/n,
where Pi is the piece received by player i, and µi is player i’s personal measure
by which she evaluates the value of a piece. It is assumed that the value of

the whole cake is 1. We skip the details of the proof of correctness, which will
be found in (Parikh 1983, 1985). The proof makes use of stability properties
analogous to that we saw in the while rule of Hoare.
To give just one example of the techniques used in the proof, let r be the move
which reduces the slice, i.e. puts something back from the slice to the main
part of the cake. This is an action which occurs repeatedly in the algorithm.
And let F (m, k) be the proposition that the main part m of the cake is large
enough for k people. Then F (m, k) is invariant under the action r. If F (m, k)
is true before r, then it is still true after. Another property which holds is that
if F (m, k + 1) is true then it can be true that after the action c, of cutting a
slice from the cake, the remaining main part is big enough for k people and the
slice itself is big enough for one. Note the contrast, that the action r preserves
F (m, k) regardless of how r is performed whereas the action c, of cutting the
cake, may yield the desired outcome but need not.
The results on cake cutting and multi modal logic which we have referred to
above have recently been extended by Marc Pauly who has formalized a logic
for coalitions.
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